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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDMUND E. GREENWELL,
Plwintvff and Respondent,
-vs.R. C. DUVALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
THE APPEAL
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court of Weber·County, Utah, Judge Charles G. Cowley,
presiding, tried without a jury. The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Decernber of 1952, plaintiff loaned Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollars to the Duvall Company, a Utah Corporation. Subsequently the Duvall Company discontinued operations and was liquidated. Plaintiff received
Three Hundred Thirty Six ($336.00) Dollars from the
Receiver upon liquidation (Tr. 179). In April, 1955,
plaintiff filed this action against defendant personally,
alleging fraud and misrepresentation on defendant's part
had induced plaintiff to advance the Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollars to the Dr~vall Company. Trial began
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on June 18, 1958, and judgment of $67 48.14 was rendered
in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on August 25,
1958. This judgment represented the full Five Thousand
( $5,000.00) Dollars comprising the loan, plus interest
thereon at seven (7%) percent per annum from the date
of the loan to the date of judgrnent, less Two Hundred
Twenty Four ($224.00) Dollars received through liquidation of the Company. On September 2, 1958, defendant
moved the court to amend the findings and for additional
findings, which motion was denied, except the court did
amend the findings, conclusions and judgn1ent to reduce
the interest computation from seven to six percent, and
to increase the liquidating credit from Two Hundred
Twenty Four ($224.00) Dollars to Three Hundred Thirty
Six ($336.00) Dollars. From this judgment defendant
appeals. (R. 40 and 42).
Because the evidence was extensive, covering a 10
year period of time and many details of a commercial
mining operation, the facts will be developed chronologically.
Defendant is a pron1inent Utah business man, President of the Utah Savings and Loan League, President
and Manager of the Ogden First Federal Savings and
Loan Association, and a director of the C01mnercial Security Bank.
In 1943, defendant first became acquainted \\ith the
properties that were later to be kno'\\rn as the Duvall
mine. These clailns were located in Cassia CountY Idaho
.'
'
just over the Idaho line northwest of Snowville, upon
the side of Black Pine Mountain. These properties were
then being explored by the original o\\rners and a
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lawrence Berrett, an amateur prospector, whom defendant knew ( Tr. 69). The owners, together with Berrett,
continued their exploration activity until 1945, when
defendant first became interested in the claims. At this
time defendant visited the properties, and thereafter took
an option for a lease upon 10 claims in the area. These
clai1ns, together with others subsequently acquired by
the Duvall Cmnpany, gave the company a mining area
of approxlinately 400 acres (Tr. 70).
Mr. Froerer came into the venture at about this
time, and Berrett, Duvall and Froerer continued the exploratory work. From this time, until incorporation of
the Company in 1950, defendant assumed the major share
of the expense of the development work (Tr. 72). The
three associates einployed an engineer, R. 0. Reddin, and
followed the development program outlined by him for
1945 and 1946, with stripping by means of a bulldozer,
diarnond drilling, and other exploratory work (Tr. 71).
In 1947, upon the recommendation of experienced
mining men, they employed as consultant Roger Pierce,
an eininently qualified Inining engineer (Tr. 75, 252-254).
Pierce examined the properties, taking samples and having assays made. Pierce's work was at his request double
checked and independently duplicated by another highly
qualified mining specialist, Miles P. Romney, who was
then a geologist employed by United States Smelting
and Refining Company, but who has for the past several
years been the Executive Director of the Utah Mining
Association, (Tr. 301). rrhese assays indicated ore of commercial value, so Pierce caused metallurgical tests to be
made to determine if the gold could economically be recovered frorn the ore. The results of these tests were
3
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"very good" (Tr. 262). Thereafter, Pierce, in collaboration with Romney, recommended extensive developn:ent
to be done on the properties, which recommendations
were followed by defendant and his associates (Tr. 257261). This work showed the ore body to be of substantial
size and values. Large samples of the ore were now submitted to the American Cyanamid Company for metallurgical and recovery tests, and the results of these tests
were very favorable (Tr. 263-264).
In January of 1950 Pierce submitted a written report
(Ex. 3) to defendant. This report stated there were available 200,000 tons of proven and probable ore reserves
having values of about $7.00 per ton. The report recommended construction of a mill to process the ore, and
estimated mining and milling costs totaling $3.28 per ton,
which on the basis of 90% recovery (as reported by
American Cyanamid Company) would leave a profit of
$3.02 per ton, or $604,000.00.
Upon this basis, the Duvall·Company was formed in
the Spring of 1950, with defendant, Berrett and Froerer
the chief stockholders. The mining claims and leases,
together with all equipment then on the properties, were
transferred to the Duvall Company at the time of incorporation. Up to this tiine, defendant had expended some
$35,000.00 of his own 1noney in the development of the
properties (Tr. 21). In order to construct the mill and
begin operations, it was, of course, necessary to obtain
funds. The C01npany borrowed from Ogden investors
$60,000.00, with defendant, Berrett and Froerer putting
in an additional $20,000.00. Miles P. Romney was employed as full time superintendent of the new operation,
and under his direction the mill was erected (Tr. 309).
4
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Operations began in September of 1950, and continued
until winter weather necessitated closing. The recoveries
made during the first year's operation were not good,
so Romney spent the winter of 1950 and 1951 with Howard Heginbotham, a metallurgical specialist, in the laboratories of the University of Utah attempting to resolve
the problen1s in the recovery process. As a result of this
research, additional equiprnent was purchased and
changes in the operation were made (Tr. 312).
The following year recoveries were improved, but
still not up to the anticipated returns. In August of
1951 health reasons forced :Mr. Romney to leave the
Duvall Company. (In January 1952, he took the position
of manager of the Utah Mining Association, a position
he still holds, and during the remaining life of the Company he actively consulted with and assisted the operators of the Duvall rnine). Mr. Val Demsey, another
experienced 1nining engineer, but who is now deceased,
\Yas employed to replace 1fr. Romney. Further plant
changes as recmnrnended by the engineers were put into
effect in 1951 and 1952 in attempting to increase the recoveries (Tr. 111, 316).
In the fall of 1952, the engineers recmnmended installation of three additional thickener tanks. This
change necessitated expenditures of over $31,500.00 (Tr.
115). r:ro rneet these costs the company had to borrow
additional funds. Defendant himself loaned $5,000 to
the Duvall Company early in December 1952, shortly
prior to the plaintiff's loan ( Tr. 117). Plaintiff at defendant's request rnet defendant at defendant's office, where
they discussed plaintiff's loan to the Duvall Company.
Defendant informed plaintiff the money was needed for
5
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the new tanks, to increase production (Tr. 174). At this
time in December of 1952 occurred the conversation that
' predicates his action
' upon.
plaintiff
With respect thereto plaintiff testified that defendant told him that the Duvall Company had blocked out
not less than 300,000 tons of ore ranging in value from
$4.20 per ton to $50.00 per ton, and which averaged not
less than $7.00 per ton. Defendant categorically denied
that he so told the plaintiff. The court found (Finding
4A, R. 27) that the defendant made the representation
that there were 300,000 tons blocked out ranging in
value from $4.20 per ton and less to $50.00 per ton, but
further found that the representation was false only in
that there were but 200,000 tons blocked out, rather than
300,000.
Plainiff further testified that defendant told hlln
he had received an offer to buy the mine for $2,000,000,
which had been refused because the mine was worth more
than that. Defendant denied he had so stated. The Court
found (Finding 4B, R. 27) that the representation was
made and it was false in that no offer had been made.
Plaintiff further testified that defendant told hlln
that the Inine was in fine condition and all bills were paid
and they were shipping ore at the rate of $30,000 a Inonth.
Defendant denied that he had so stated to plaintiff. The
Court found (Finding ±C, R. :27) only that defendant had
represented that the 1nine was in fine condition, when
in fact it was not in good financial or Inechanical operating condition.
Plaintiff further testified that defendant told him
that it would be ilupossible for any investor to lose a cent,
6
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as there was more than enough ore blocked out to pay
all notes with interest. Defendant denied that he had
so represented. The Court found (Finding 4D, R. 27)
that the statement had been made by defendant, when in
truth the mining operation was then costing more than
was being received, and there was not sufficient income
fron1 operations to pay the costs of operations or the
company's obligations.
The mine operated again in the Spring of 1953, and
operated through 1953 until October when it was closed
and subsequently put into liquidation. During its 1953
operations, the mine processed 60,450 tons of ore, with
receipts of $169,131.20 (Ex. Y). However, the percentage
of gold recoveries, despite the additional tanks and other
improvements installed, remained relatively low, and the
Cmnpany was forced to discontinue its operations. During the 4 years of operation, 113,409 tons of ore were
mined, and the Company received $351,250.77 from sales
of gold. Costs, including capital expenditures as well as
operating costs, far exceeded the Company's receipts.
(Ex. Y).
Particularly significant facts developed at the trial
include the following:
The $5,000.00 advanced to the Duvall Company by
plaintiff came from plaintiff's business checking account,
and was shortly thereafter replaced by monies withdrawn
frmn a savings account held jointly by plaintiff and
plaintiff's wife (Tr. 210). In return for his $5,000.00,
plaintiff received the note of the Duvall Company in
that amount payable in two years with seven (7%) percent interest, and stock in the Duvall Company of the
7
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par value of $5,000.00 (Tr. 202). Both the note a~d
stock were taken and held jointly by plaintiff and his
wife, Matilda B. Greenwell (Ex. M and V). This stock
was transferred to plaintiff and his wife from the private
holdings of defendant, not from the Duvall Company.
Defendant lost over $68,000.00 of his own n1oney on
the development of the mining properties and loans to
the Duvall Company, no part of which has been repaid
(Tr. 140). Defendant did not receive any part of the
$5,000.00 loaned by plaintiff, which was expended by the
Duvall Company for the purposes defendant had explained to plaintiff (Tr. 128). Defendant received no
compensation of any kind for his services to the Company or his expenses incurred and time used in behalf of
the Company (Tr. 117-118). Defendant's good faith
and belief in the Cmnpany are evidenced by the fact
that he loaned $5,000 to the Company just a few days
prior to plaintiff's loan. Throughout the entire life of
the Company, and the development work prior to its
organization, top 1nining engineers and consultants were
constantly on the job. Defendant is not a nrining man,
but he did seek the best n1en a-vailable and follmYed their
advice throughout. There is no suggestion of misuse of
corporate funds, excessive salaries, or other badges of
fraud and personal aggrandize1uent. The operation was
an honest, \\~en 1uanaged one and it is certainly not the
fault of this defendant that the recovery proble:ms were
never solved to the point of being able to operate profitably.
Certified public accountants \\~ere e1nployed by plaintiff's counsel to search for "financial irregularities" in
the operation of the Duvall Cmnpany. The results of this
~
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search were incorporated in a "Special Report for Certain Creditors, September 27, 1954." (Exhibit 13), addressed to Mr. Arthur I-I. Nielsen, Attorney at Law. This
report contained the following statement of Mr. Nielsen's
specially hired investigators :
"While our examination was limited and
could not be considered as an audit or even a test
audit, we found no evidence of irregularities as
far as recorded transactions are concerned. Mr.
Stockdale informed us that in their examinations,
which were more extensive than ours, they likewise
found no evidence of irregularities, and that there
were invoices or other data in the files to support
every transaction that they checked."
III.
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL
Defendant relies upon the following points for reversal of the lower court:
1.

The lower court erred in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and in
permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint during the trial.

2.

The lower court erred in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's
case.

3.

The lower court erred in receiving in evidence
the testimony of the witnesses Felt, Tansil,
Douglas, Foulger and Shreeve.

4.

The evidence in favor of plaintiff is not clear
and convincing, and does not support the findings of fact or the judgment.
9
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5.

The representations found by the court to have
been made were not actionable as a matter of
law.

6.

The lower court neglected and refused to make
findings of fact as required by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

7.

There is no proof of damage to plaintiff in this
case.

IV. ARGUMENT
1.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT, AND IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF
TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT DURING THE TRIAL.

Plaintiff:s complaint, as originally filed on April
6, 1955, was fatally defective in that (a) while pleading
that the alleged representations were generally false, the
plaintiff did not plead the particulars or degree of the
falsity as required under Rule 9 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and as required by this Court's decision in
the case of Davis Stock Company z:. Hill, 2 Utah (2) 20,
268 P. (2) 988, and (b) it predicated damages, which is
an essential element of fraud, upon the Duvall Con1pany's
insolvency at the tin1e the complaint was filed, son1e two
and a half years after the transaction cmnplained of,
rather than upon the basis of the factual situation existing at the time of the transaction.
Following the filing of the complaint, defendant
moved to dis1niss it upon the ground of its failing to
state any claim, (R. 3), which motion the court after
'
hearing, denied. The defendant then answered, raising
tlris point as its First Defense (R. 5), and in due course
10
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took the plaintiff's deposition upon the basis of the complaint as it stood. No pre-trial conference was called
by the Court, and thus the matter remained until the case
came on for trial on June 18, 1958. At the commencement
of the trial the defendant renewed the objection under
his first defense, (Tr. 1), and then the plaintiff for the
first time asked leave to amend to (1) add the particulars
of falsity, (2) to add an allegation of insolvency at the
time of the transaction, and ( 3) to add completely new
grounds for relief, i.e., additional representations claimed
to have been made by defendant and relied upon by plaintiff. (Tr. 4, Amendment to complaint, R. 16).
Defendant, while recognizing the policy of the rules
to be such as to allow amendments freely when justice
so requires, nevertheless felt obligated to object in this
case because not only did justice not require the requested leave to amend, but granting leave under the circumstances constituted a gross abuse of discretion which
this Court should rectify.
In the first place, defendant had prepared for trial
upon the basis of the complaint as originally filed, and in
so doing he was doubly justified, first, because the complaint as pleaded constituted the only charge against him,
and secondly, because defendant had taken plaintiff's
deposition in which plaintiff was carefully examined with
respect to the allegations of the complaint, and in which
deposition defendant had gone even further and asked
plaintiff specifically if the charges contained in the
complaint contained all of the charges upon which he was
relying, and plaintiff replied that it did. (See page 10
of plaintiff's deposition, received in evidence as Exhibit
12).
11
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"Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

I take it you have read the complaint that was
filed in your behalf in this action~
Correct.
.
"~
And you read it before it was f1led or after ·
After.
After it was filed, but you now know what
it contains.
Yes, sir.
And that complaint states the charges which
you make and desire to make against Mr.
Duvall~

A.
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.
And states them fully~
Yes, sir. I'll correct my answer. I read the
complaint before it was filed."

Thus, despite plaintiff's solemn assertion to defendant that the original complaint stated fully the alleged
misrepresentations upon which plaintiff relied for recovery, the court, over defendant's objections, permitted
during the trial amendments thereto which added completely new charges of misrepresentation as to which
defendant had never been previously informed.
Further than that, the arnendn1ents permitted areaffirmation by plaintiff of rnatters which he had under
oath disavowed in his deposition. For exarnple, both in
the original c01nplaint and in the arnendrnents, plaintiff
alleged that defendant represented to hiin (1) that all
of the bills of the C01npany were paid, and (2) that it
would be impossible for any investor to lose a cent. Yet
in his deposition he had expressly disavowed that Mr.
Duvall had so represented. At page 8 and 9 of the deposition is the following:

"Q.

Did he say to you on that occasion that the
operating bills were paid~
A. No, he told me it was in fine condition they,
12
'
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were shipping regularly.
But you don't recall his making the statement
that the operating bills were paid.
A. Not in those words, no. I knew some of them
were not paid because they had the tanks and
they were not paid for.
Q. So that you knew there were some unpaid
bills.
A. I presumed there was."

Q.

And further on page 9 :

"Q.

Now, did he say to you that because there
was more than enough ore blocked out to pay
all notes with interest, it would be impossible
for anyone to lose any money in it~
A. I don't know as he said anyone. He said there
was maybe enough blocked out that I would
receive my money before the end of the year
rather than two years." (Italics added.)

And so the lower court, by allowing the amendments,
permitted the paintiff at the time of trial not only to
completely reverse himself on the element of damages by
switching frorn insolvency in 1955 to insolvency in 1952,
but also to reassert representations completely disavowed
by hiln in the discovery processes.
~N e

submit that a party plaintiff is not to be per1Lutted to thus play fast and loose with a defendant's
defenses and with his trial preparation, and the lower
court erred in permitting the amendments to plaintiff's
complaint.
2.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

Plaintiff's theory of his cause of action as evidencerl
by his pleadings and proof was that he had been induced

13
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by false representations of the defendant to make a loaiJ
of $5,000.00 to the Duvall Company. That because of the
falsity of the representaions the Duvall Company was
unable to repay the loan, and as a consequence plaintiff
was damaged in the amount of the unpaid loan. Thus the
cause of action was pleaded and attempted to be proven.
During the course of plaintiff's proof, however, he
introduced in evidence the promissory note of the Duvall
Company which had been received by him to evidence the
Company's obligation, and it there appeared that the
note was payable not to the plaintiff alone, but to "Edmund E. Greenwell and Mathilda B. Greenwell, husband
and wife, as joint tenants with full right of survivorship,
and not as tenants in common". (Exhibit :JI).
He further testified that he initially made the loan
by drawing a check upon his business account, but shortly
thereafter replaced the money in his business account
by withdrawing a like amount from a savings and loan
account which he and his wife, Mathilda B. Greenwell,
jointly owned. He further testified that his wife, :Jiatlrilda B. Greenwell was still alive. (Tr. 209, 210).
Thus plaintiff established by his o-w11 testilnony not
only that the unpaid obligation of the Duvall -company
by which his dan1ages were to be 1neasured, was an obligation in which his wife had an interest and not one
as to which he was the sole owner, but also that the funds
themselves which con1prised the loan were funds in which
she had an ownership interest.
Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the
' for
plaintiff rested, and thereupon the defendant 1noved
dismissal upon the ground, among others, that the plain-

14
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rL

tiff had failed to prove actionable damage to himself in
any identifiable amount, and for the further reason that
Mrs. Greenwell was an indispensable party. Plaintiff did
not seek leave to reopen to supplement his proof of
damages, nor seek in any way to have Mrs. Greenwell
brought in either as a witness or as a party.
At the outset we recognize that there is some split
In the authorities upon the proposition that persons
jointly injured by the fraud of another must jointly sue
to recover the damage. We do not find that this Court
has ever passed upon this point, but sub1nit that the
better reasoned view is that they must so join in asserting the fraud, particularly in the light of the provisions
of Rule 19 (a) and (b), U.R.C.P. as follows:
"(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of
this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who
should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his
consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a
defendant, or in proper cases, an involuntary
plaintiff.
"(b) ElTFECT OF FAILURE TO JOIN. When
persons who are not indispensable, but who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties, have not been Inade
parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the
court as to service of process, the court shall
order them summoned to appear in the action.
The Court in its discretion may proceed in the
action without 1naking such persons parties, if its
jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the
judgment rendered therein does not affect the
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rights or liabilities of absent persons."
With this we submit for the Court's consideration
the case of Evola Realty Co. v. Westerfield (Ky) 251
S.W. (2) 298, a fraud action:
"By special demurrer and also in their ans~er
appellants raised the question of defect of parties
in that appellee, Nellie B. Westerfield, had no
authority to maintain this action unless Earl F.
Westerfield was joined as a party thereto. It
stands admitted that Mr. Westerfield was a joint
purchaser of the property under the contract
dated May 23, 1944, and that he later became a
joint grantee in the deed. The record does not
disclose that Mr. Westerfield assigned to his former wife the right to sue for damages in respect
to the property; nor do appellee's pleadings show
any facts that would preclude his being made a
party to this litigation.
"Under Section 18 of the Civil Code of Practice
every action 1nust be prosecuted in the name of
the real party or parties in interest. In the joint
acquisition of the house, if any damage was sustained by virtue of fraud, appellee does not have
the sole right to collect all of the damage but she
and Earl F. \Vesterfield must jointly maintain
an action for such recovery. This is a suit based
upon tort, and the applicable rule is well stated
in 24 A1n. Jur., Fraud and Deceit. Sec. 240, P. 69,
in this language :
'Under accepted principles of practice persons jointly affected by a tort must join in an
action to recover for the injury. Joint purchasers of real estate bought in reliance upon
false representations concerning the size and
loc~tion of the propert)- n1ust join in an
action to recover da1nages for the fraud thus
perpetrated upon then1, as 1nust partners,
who seek to recover damages for fraud in-

16
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eluding the sale of the firm property.'
"As Mr. Westerfield was a necessary party to this
action, the trial court committed reversible error
when it refused to sustain the special demurrer
and thereby authorized appellee to sue in her
name alone. See also 39 Am. J ur ., Parties, Sec.
32, P. 896."
Notwithstanding this authority, however, and assuming for the sake of the argument that the plaintiff
has in fact and in law an independent claim for his own
damage, namely, a claim that is not dependent upon a
joinder therein by the other co-owner, he must, in order
to prove his claim, prove hit; own damage. This court has
held, Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. (2) 1094, and,
so far as we know, its a rule of universal application,
that a fraud action is unlike other tort actions in which
damage may be assumed, because in a fraud action damage is an essential elernent of the offense itself, and must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the same as
the other elements.
Now what is the proof of damage in this case~ While
proof is that the obligation of the Duvall Company under
this note is unpaid, the proof further shows that such
obligation is not wholly owned by plaintiff, and certainly
plaintiff could not be damaged in any event beyond the
amount of his ownership interest therein.
In G.arrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P. (2) 449,
this court held :
"The note, the subject of this controversy, as
heretofore indicated sirnply designated two
payees, to either of which payrnent could be made.
'Such a note raises the presumption of a joint
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ownership and of a coequal interest in the~,
but this does not preclude proof that theu
interests were separate and unequal.' 8 C.J;
177, Sec. 302; Tisdale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40.
"Where a conveyance is made in the names of a
number of parties to an instrument, and the conveyance does not show respective interests, the
presumption is that they own in equal shares, but
such presumption 1s rebuttable by parol
evidence."
Thus, in a proper case it might be said that presumptively Mr. and Mrs. Greenwell owned the note equally,
and in the absence of evidence to the contrary the plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages based upon
half its face amount. Frankly, we do not agree that such
presumption could be indulged in the present case, because it is not a conclusive presumption and is in no
wise binding on Mrs. Greenwell. In other words, without
Mrs. Greenwell before the court in some capacity-as a
party defendant under Rule 19 (b) if necessary, the
court was powerless to determine the O"\\Tflership interest
of plaintiff in the note, or indulge any presumptions in
aid thereof, and \\rithout a detennination of plaintiff's
ownership interest the court was without a yardstick to
measure his damage. Certainly in fixing his damage in
the full face anwunt of the note, less the non1inal payment
that had been received through liquidation of the company, and in awarding judg1uent in such runount, the
lower court was not only arbitrary and capricious, but
it acted in total disregard of evidence that conclusively
established that he was not sole owner of the obliO'ation
0
and that he had not sustained damage to the full face
amount ther~of.
18
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3.

'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN
EVIDENCE 'THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FELT, TANSIL, DOUGLAS, FOULGER AND
SHREEVE.

During the presentation of plaintiff's case the lower
court received, over defendant's objections, the testimony
of the witnesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and
Shreeve, which testi1nony was to the effect that the defendant had, on specified occasions, made statements to
them concerning the mine. These statements were not
made in the presence of the plaintiff, nor were they relayed to him, nor were they made in relationship in any
way to plaintiff's transactions. The transaction with
plaintiff, and the date of the statements to hiin, was December 22, 1952. The dates of the statements to those
other witnesses were as follows:
Felt- November 15, 1951 (Tr. 218).
Tansil - April 24, 1952 (R. 220)
Douglas- May 5, 1952 (Tr. 224)
Foulger- October, 1951 (Tr. 222).
Shreeve- June, 1951 (Tr. 225).
Thus the representations which were the subject of
Felt's testimony were nmde thirteen months prior to the
representations to plaintiff. Those to Tansil were made
eight Inonths prior. Those to Douglas were made
nearly eight months prior. Those to Foulger were made
fifteen months prior, and those to Shreeve were made
a year and one-half prior to Dec. 22, 1952. The testimony
was received by the court, over defendant's objections
(Tr. 217, 219, 222, 225, 226) upon the issue of defendant's
motive and intent. (Tr. 215)
19
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This court in two previous cases has considered this
question. In Trout and Resort Company vs Lewis, 41
Utah 183, 125 P. 687, this court quoted the rule enunciated in 6 Ency. Ev. p. 33 with approval as follows:
"Where the fraudulent intent of a party in the
performance of an act is in issue, proof o~ other
similar fraudulent acts is relevant and admissable
to establish his intent or motive in the performance of the act in question, when it appears that
there is such a connection between such other acts
and the act in question as to authorize the inference that both are parts of one scheme or plan, in
which the same motive is operative, and it is immaterial whether such other frau-dulent acts occurred before or after the act in question, as remoteness in point of time affects only their
weight. Evidence of such other fraudulent act.:;
is usually offered upon the issue of motive or
intent, and some of the decisions limit its competency to the proof of these issues. Such evidence, however, has been held competent to establish the party's knowledge of the falsity of his
representations, to prove a system of fraud or
a fraudulent conspiracy, and to identify the person charged as the fraudulent actor." (Italics
supplied)
And in Smith v. Gilbert, 49 Ctah 510, 164 P. 1026,
the court quoted from Trout v Len·is,. supra, as follows:

"False representations, siinilar to the ones involved in an action, are adn1issible where the
intent, motive, or lmowledge of their falsity by
the party 1naking the1n are Inaterial, or where it
is sought to prove a syste1n or general plan or
sche1ne to defraud." (Italics supplied)
In each case, it is to be noted, the rule is lhnited to
si1nilar "fraudulent acts" or similar "false representa-
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tions". Similar representations as such, made to another,
do not ipso facto qualify ·under the rule, but it is only
when such similar acts or representations are themselves
shown to be false or fraudulent that they become admissible. To qualify their admissibility the party offering
them must first lay the foundation of falsity and fraudulentness as to them, which the plaintiff in this case
neither did nor attempted to do.
The logic and soundness of this requirement cannot
be denied. A simple example will demonstrate. If A, to
induce B to n1ake a loan to X Company represents to B
that X is paying Inonthly dividends, and the representation is false the same may be actionable as to B, assuming
the other essential elements of fraud are present. During
the trial of B's action he seeks to prove that a year earlier A had made the same representation to C. The X
Company may well have been paying dividends at the
time the representation was made to C, and the representation thus be truthful as to C. Accordingly, the rule
must of necessity be, as stated in the Utah cases, supra,
that it is only similar fraudulent acts or false representations that are admissible upon the question of intent,
motive or common scheme, and until they are shown to
be fraudulent or false as to the witness they are not
admissible in the action.
The plaintiff having failed to lay the foundation
necessary to admissibility, the testimony was inadmissible for any purpose, and the court erred in receiving
it.
There is still a further reason why the testimony
was inadmissible in this case. There was and has been no
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contention on the part of the plaintiff that the transaction involving the plaintiff was a part of a common
scheme or plan also involving the other witnesses, nor,
of course, is there any evidence to support any such
claim. Further there was and has been no contention on
the part of the defendant that he didn't intend to say
what he did say, that is, no mistake is claimed by him,
nor is there any contention but that his motive was that
his representations be relied upon by plaintiff and a loan
be induced. This was the point before the Supreme Court
of Oregon in Menefee v. Blitz (Ore) 179 P. (2) 550:
"It is next contended that evidence of similar
frauds is admissible to prove 'motive, intent or
scienter.' The rule governing that contention is
stated in Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Sec. 341;
37 ·C.J.S., Fraud, Sec. 113 page 42±, and 24 A.m.
Jur. Fraud and Deceit Sec. 270, page 109. The
latter authority says, in part: 'An important limitation upon the adlnissibility of similar frauds is
that they are competent only on the issue of
motive or intention, and, hence, are not admissible
in an action for fraud in which the right to relief
does not depend upon establishing _scienter,
motive or intent.'
"The challenged evidence does not prove or disprove that Mr. Blitz knew that the representations
which it is clain1ed he 1nade ·were false. Hence,
the testimony of 1\fr. Sheppard and ~Ir. 1\Ienefee,
Sr., showed nothing concerning scienter. Intent
and motive were not in issue upon the trial. \Y e
have shown by quotation frmn the answer that
the appellant adlnitted that 1\fr. Blitz sold to the
respondent 20,000 shares of stock for $5.000 and
that in so doing he told the respondent ,that 'an
oil sand had been discovered at a depth of 700
feet in the well whi~~ was being drilled.~ Thus,
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it was conceded that Mr. Blitz's statements to
the respondent were made with the intention of
inducing him to buy stock. It was freely admitted
at the trial that after the drilling operations
started Mr. Blitz talked to several men for the
purpose of persuading them to join him in the
venture, and that some of them contributed capital. Mr. Ulrich persuaded his brother-in-law to
join the venture, and, referring to Mr. Sheppard,
testified: 'I was trying to get Blitz to get him in
for his advice and counsel, I wasn't particular
about getting any money out of him.' According
to one of the exhibits, Mr. Blitz said before his
death: 'My whole talk with everybody was that I
didn't want any widows or orphans in. If they
couldn't afford to gamble, I advised them not to
come in.' Thus there was no issue at the trial concerning intent or motive. The· i:ssue was whether
or not the statements which Mr. Blitz made to the
respondent were true or false." (Italics Added)
Common scheme or plan, intent and motive, not being
issues in the case, the testimony of those witnesses was
clearly improper, and served no purpose but to clearly
prejudice the defendant in his denials that the representations were ever made.
Again we call the court's attention to the fact that
under the above case, as well as under the rule therein
quoted from Wigmore, C.J.S. and Am. Jur. that even
where intent and motive is an issue it is only sin1ilar
fra·uds that are admissible. Until the similar representations have themselves been shown to be fraudulent,
they are not admissible for any purpose.
We submit that the court committed patent and
reversible error in receiving the testimony of these witnesses as it did.
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4.

THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF IS
NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING, AND DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE
JUDGMENT.
1

Not Clear and Convincing.
By the original
complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant made certain
representations, false in nature, upon which he relied to
his damage. Those representations, as pleaded by plaintiff, were as follows:
(a)

That 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked out
which assayed as high as $50.00 per ton.
(b) That an offer of $2,000,000 had been turned
down for the mine because of its greater value.
(c) That all operating bills were paid, and everything was going fine at the mine.
(d) That it would be impossible for any investor
to lose one cent of money, as there ·was more
than enough ore blocked out to pay all notes
with interest.

Plaintiff's deposition ,,-as taken (Exhibit 12), in
which he reaffirn1ed in effect the representations in (a)
and (b) above, denied that defendant had represented to
him that all bills were paid, as he had alleged in (c)
above, (Ex. 12 Pg. 8 and 9), and with respect to (d)
stated that what defendant had actually told him was
only that "There was 1naybe enough ore blocked out
that I would receive 111y n1one~~ before the end of the year,
rather than two years". (Ex. 1:2, Pg. 9). Thus, as between
his cmnplaint and his deposition there was a direct conflict as to plaintiff hhnself with respect to representations (c) and (d). He further testified in his deposition
(Ex. 12 Pg. 10) that the complaint stated "fully" his
24
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charges against the defendant.
Subsequently and during the trial, plaintiff amended
his complaint and reasserted the (c) and (d) representations of his original complaint (which he had disavowed
in deposition), and, despite the fact that he had sworn
under oath in his deposition that there were no other
representations upon which he relied, he added new representations claimed to have been made to him by defendant as follows :
(e)
(f)
(g)

That the minimum value of the ore was $4.20
per ton.
That the average value of the ore body was
$7.00 per ton.
That they were shipping ore at the rate of
$30,000 per month.

As a witness on his own behalf he testified that all
of the representations (a) through (g) were made to
him by defendant on this short visit he made to Mr.
Duvall's office. His testimony in this connection was in
no wise corroborated and was categorically denied by
defendant. Thus, the proof of whether the representations were or were not made lay solely in the sworn
word of plaintiff that they were, and of defendant that
they were not.
Under the decisions of this court, plaintiff's proof
of fraud must be by "clear and convincing evidence".

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P (2) 273. In the case
of Greener vs Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. (2)
194, the court considered the meaning of "Clear and
convincing" proof as follows:
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"But for a matter to be clear and convincing to
a particular mind it must at least h~ve reached
the point where there remains no senous or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it was
convinced and yet which entertained, not a slight,
but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its
conclusion, would seem to be in a state of confusion."
In Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P (2) 621,
this court held that while the trial court's conclusions
should be given weight, this court reserves the right to
review the matter.

"The question of whether evidence is sufficient
to be clear and convincing is primarily for the
trial court; his finding should not be disturbed
unless we must say as a matter of law that no
one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear
and convincing."
We submit that this is a case in which this court
should well say that "no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing'' in favor of the
plaintiff. Let us review the matter.
Plaintiff and defendant are both long tune reputable
business men of Ogden-plaintiff as a merchant and
restaurant operator-defendant as a director of a bank
and as president of a savings and loan association. Plaintiff, having never previously heard of the mining operation, and with no inforn1ation as to who was connected
with it, and with no infonnation whatever as to its corporate or financial structure (other than that defendant
was its president) after a conference of from fifteen
minutes to half hour with defendant, agreed to loan
and did loan the company $5,000.00. He clailns he was
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induced to do so by the representations of the defendant
above set forth.
Defendant, on the other hand, denied categorically
that he made the representations claimed by plaintiff,
and on the contrary testified that he had reviewed with
him generally the problerns the company had had in the
past in getting recoveries that the engineers and laboratories had assured him could be expected, told him
that the engineers felt that they were getting the operating problems solved and with the installation of new
tanks the operation should be successful. Also that despite the problems of the past he had confidence in the
future, and had himself put in $5,000.00 more about two
weeks earlier. Defendant's testimony was without equivocation.
As compared to this, plaintiff contradicted himself
time and time again. For example he first claimed that
defendant told hirn all bills were paid and that no investor would lose a cent. Later under oath by way of deposition he acknowledged that defendant did not tell him
all bills were paid, and acknowledged that he then knew
of outstanding bills. Further in his deposition he testified
that instead of defendant stating that no investor would
lose a cent as there was more than enough ore blocked
out to pay all notes with interest, what defendant had
really said was that there was maybe enough ore blocked
out that he would get his money back in a year instead
of two. Thus, at this point there was direct contradiction
by plaintiff himself on two vital parts of his evidence.
Still later and at the trial, while acknowledging
that he had testified in his deposition as above set out,
he disavowed the same and reasserted his earlier claims
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-thus contradicting his sworn deposition.
Further, in his deposition he testified that his original complaint stated "fully" the representations made
by defendant, but at the trial claimed that still others
had been made, namely, that the ore had a minimum
value of $4.20 per ton, that it averaged $7.00 per ton,
and that the company was shipping $30,000.00 worth of
gold a month.
Significant is the fact that the trial court itself disbelieved his trial testimony to a very considerable degree,
for, as evidenced by its findings, it did not believe his
testimony that defendant represented that the bills were
paid, that the minimum value of the ore was $4.20, that
its average value was $7.00, or that the company was
shipping $30,000.00 of gold a month.
Nevertheless and despite these many contradictions,
and despite the conflicts in plaintiff's own sworn testimony, and despite the trial court's determination that
it could not believe parts of plaintiff's testimony with
regard to the representations, the trial court found in
plaintiff's favor.
Were this a case in which this court was bound to
uphold the trial court if there "-as any evidence to support its findings, the point now being discussed would
never be raised. Such, however, is not tlris case, because
any evidence is not enough. The evidence must be clear
and convincing, and this court 1nust review it to determine if it 1neets that test.
Charges of fraud are easy to n1ake and hard to defend against, particularly where, as here, the principals
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alone were present. Thus it is that the law requires clear
and convincing proof of fraud, and we submit that plaintiff's testimony, so shot full of contradictions and conflicts as it is does not as a matter of law arise to the
dignity of clear and convincing proof required in a fraud
action.
Here the vice in receiving the testimony of the witnesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and Shreeve as
to representations purportedly made to them, is accentuated. Absent that testimony, and in the light of the contradictions and conflicts in plaintiff's testimony, it is
obvious that no one could reasonably find that plaintiff's
evidence on the matter was "clear and convincing". But
that evidence was in, and while it was ostensibly received
for a limited purpose, it taxes the credulity to believe
that it did not play a vital, albeit an improper, part in
the trial court's finding that the representations were
made.
5.

THE REPRESENTATIONS FOUND BY THE COURT
TO HAVE BEEN MADE WERE NOT A·CTIONABLE
AS A MA'TTER OF LAW.

The lower court found that certain representations
were 1nade by defendant to plaintiff which representations were false, and in reliance thereon plaintiff made a
loan to the Duvall Company to his damage.
We have heretofore demonstrated that the lower
court erred in finding the representations were made for
the reason that plaintiff's evidence in support thereof
was anything but clear and convincing, but we now approach the matter from the standpoint that even if they
were made, they and each of them are not actionable as a
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matter of law.
The representations so found by the court to have
been made are as follows :
"4. Said false and fraudulent representations so made to the Plaintiff are as follows:
"(A) That said Duvall Mining Company
had, as a result of diamond drilling and tunnelling, blocked out 300,000 tons of ore containing
Gold ranging in value from $4.20 per ton and
less, to as high as $50.00 per ton \Yhen in truth
and in fact Defendant well knew that only 200,000
tons of proven and probable ore had been blocked
out.
"(B) That Defendant had received an offer
to buy said mine for $2,000,000.00 which offer had
been refused because said mine was worth more
than that, when in truth and in fact Defendant
well knew that no offer whatever had been received for the purchase of said mine.
" (C) That said mine was then in fine condition, when in truth and in fact Defendant well
knew that said mine was not in fine condition,
either financially or in good 1nechanical operating
condition.
"(D) That it would be impossible for any
investor to lose one cent of n1oney, as there wa8
more than enough ore blocked out to pay all the
notes with interest, \vhen in truth and in fact
said 1nining operation was then costing 1nort~
than was being received therefrmn, and there was
not sufficient incmne frmn production to pay the
obligations owing by the corporation or the costs
of operation." (Paragraph 4 of Findings, R. 27)

By a series of decisions, of which Pace Y. Parrish,
122 Utah 141, 247 P. (2) 273, is one of the leading, tllis
court has held that actionable fraud consists of a series
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of elements, each of which is essential to recovery. We
confine ourselves for present purposes to a consideration
of but two of these elmnents, (1) the representation must
be of a presently existing material fact, and (2) the
damage must proximately flow from its falsity. If the
representation is not of a material fact, or, even if damage be shown, and it is not shown to have resulted from
the falsity of the representation, plaintiff's action fails.
We submit that either one or both of these essential elements is lacking with respect to each representation
found by the court to have been made.
(a) The first representation found by the court
to have been made is that:
"The Duvall Company had as a result of
diamond drilling and tunnelling blocked out not
less than 300,000 tons of ore containing gold ranging in value from $4.20 per ton and less to as high
as $50.00, when in truth and in fact Defendant
well knew that only 200,000 tons of proven and
probable ore had been blocked out." (Finding 4
(a), R. 27)
It is to be noted that the court did not find falsity
as to the ore values, but only as to the tonnage, so we
concern ourselves only with the representation in its relat~~nship to the number of tons blocked out. Unless the
falsity of that representation, namely, that there were
300,000 tons blocked out when in truth there were but

200,000 tons, proximately resulted in damage, plaintiff's
cause of action as predicated upon that representation
fails as a matter of law.
The uncontradicted evidence in the case shows that
the cmnpany started its mining operations in the Fall
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of 1950 and discontinued them in the Fall of 1953. To
the end' of showing the extent of the Company's operations by years, and the cost thereof in comparison to
revenues, plaintiff, as a part of his case, put in evidence
Exhibit Y, a recap of the operations, ·which was and is
uncontradicted and uncontested. The exhibit showed that
in 1950 there was processed 4,491 tons ; in 1951, 21,468
tons; in 1952, 27,000 tons ; and in 1953, 60,450 tons. Thus
during the total period of operations a total of 113,409
tons were mined and processed. During each year of
the operations, as further shown by the Exhibit, the cost
of recovering the gold exceeded substantially the value
of the gold recovered; and it is uncontradicted that ultimate discontinuance of the mining operations was dictated by this cost factor.
The particular significance of the exhibit lies in the
fact that but a total of 113,409 tons of ore were mined
up to the time the company finally determined that it
was economically unsound to attempt further operations,
and so, whether only 87,000 tons of a 200,000 ton blocked
out ore body was left in the ground, or 181,000 tons of a
300,000 ton ore body was left, did not and could not contribute in any wise to plaintiff's loss. In other words,
for this representation as to tonnage to be actionable, it
was incu1nbent upon plaintiff to prove that the absence
of the additional 100,000 tons proximately contributed
to his drunage. This he not only ,,-holly failed to prove,
but on the contrary he affinnatively proved that this
additional 100,000 tons had nothing whatever to do with
it, because the cmnpany was forced to discontinue operaore
tions long before it had e:xl1austed the acknowled<>'ed
0
body of 200,000 tons.
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We submit that upon the basis of the evidence the
representation that there were 300,000 tons blocked out,
when there was actually but 200,000 tons, was non-actionable as a matter of law for the reason that it did not
result in damage.
(b) The second representation found by the Court
to have been made was,
"That defendant had received an offer to buy
said mine for $2,000,000, which offer had been refused because said mine was worth more than
that." (Finding 4 (b) R. 27).
With respect to this representation, we submit that
even if false it is non-actionable, first, because it is not
the type of representation upon which reliance can be
placed, and second, no damage did or could proximately
result from its falsity.
From the standpoint of materiality, neither portion
of the representation can stand the test. That misrepresentations as to previous offers of purchase cannot for1n
the basis of actionable fraud has been established in a
long series of decisions, dating from very early days.
For example, in 1 Rolle, Abr. 801, pl. 6, it is said:
"If a man having a term for years offers to
sell it to another, and says that a stranger would
give him 20 pounds for it, by means of which assertion the other buys it, when in truth the vendor
was never offered 20 pounds for the term, though
the vendee is deceived in the value, yet in truth
no action on the case lies. And it has been asserted that a statement by the vendor that he has been
offered a certain sum for his property is not a
representation of fact which may be relied upon
as the foundation for a charge of fraud."
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Page v. Parker (N.H.) 80 Am. Dec.173-177:

"No action will lie for a false representation
by the vendor concerning the value of the thing
sold, it being deemed the folly of the P"':rchaser to
credit the assertion and beside, value IS a matter
of judgment and es-fimation about which men may
differ. Nor will an action lie for a false affirmation that a person bid a particular sum for the
estate, although the vendee was thereby induced
to purchase, and was deceived as to the value."
Cole v. Smith (Colo.) 58 Pac. 1086:

"A mere affirmation or exaggeration, by the
vendor of real estate, of its value and the price
he has been offered for it, are, 'as stated by Kerr
in his work on Fraud and :Jiistake, at Page 84,'
assumed to be so commonly made by persons having property for sale that a purchaser cannot
safely place confidence in them": *** it is quite
uniformly held that a staten1ent by a vendor that
he had been offered a certain sum for his property, or that it is of any given value, are not such
representations of fact as to be the foundation of
an action."
Clark v. MorriU,

(~Iaine)

145 A 7±-±:

"So far as representations as to value of the
stock are concerned, if such were n1ade, the law
is well settled in this state that the staten1ent3
of the vendor as to its value, or the price which he
has given or been offered for it, are so connnonly
n1ade by those having property to sell in order to
enhance its value, that any purchaser who confides in then1 is considered as too careless of his
own interests to be entitled to relief, even if the
statements are false and are intended to deceive.~'
Palrrwr Y. Bell, 85 l\fe. 352, :27 ~\ :230~ Lona Y.
Woodman, 58 Me. 49, 52; Bvshop Y. Small, 63,:Me.
12; Bourn v. Davis, 76 l\Ie. 223; B~raley Y. Pazccrs.
92 Me. 203, 42 A 362."
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The (b) portion of the statement to the effect that
the mine was worth more than $2,000,000.00, is, of course,
but an opinion of value and not actionable. Particularly
is this true when evaluating a mining property. As stated
in Byers v. Federal Land Company, 3 F. (2) 9,
"A statement of the monetary value of the
property with no definite market value such as a
mine, an invention, old and used goods, or of
lands, is generally made and understood as an expression of opinion only, and not as a representation of fact, and is not ordinarily an actionable
representation."
And in Myers v. Charness (Ok.) 245 P. 879, which
concerned representations of value as to a partially
drilled oil well, the court held the alleged representation
not actionable, citing Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 26
L. Ed. 1166, where the Supreme Court of the United
States held:
"Whenever property of any kind depends for
its value upon contingencies which may never
occur, or developments which may never be made,
opinion as to its value must, necessarily be more
or less of a speculative character; and no action
will lie for its expression, however fallacious it
may prove, or whatever the injury a reliance upon it may produce."
There is still a further reason why this representation is non-actionable in this case.
As previously noted, for this representation to be
actionable, the falsity thereof must proximately have resulted in damage to the plaintiff. In other words, the
fact that no such offer to purchase was ever made must
be shown by the evidence to have adversely affected the
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value of the note as measured by the Company's inability
to repay the same.
To state the proposition is to negative it. While it
might be argued from plaintiff's standpoint that the
factual existence of such an offer having been made
might be an inducement for his making the loan, inducement is not enough, and certainly there is no evidence whatever to the effect that the existence or nonexistence of the offer did or could affect one way or another the value of the note.
In this connection it is to be noted that plaintiff
under cross-examination was questioned closely as to the
offer to which Mr. Duvall allegedly referred, being one
that was then pending, or one that had been made and
rejected, and plaintiff was adamant that it was one that
had been rejected (Tr. 197). Thus, whether it had never
been made, as found by the court, or whether it had in
fact been made and rejected, forces the same conclusion,
namely, that it wasn't and could not be a contributing
factor to the value of plaintiff's note or of the con1pany's
ability to repay the same.
Damage is an essential ele1nent of fraud, and unless
the falsity of the representation relied upon proximately
results 'in damage to the plaintiff, it is at most but
"fraud in the air."
(c) The third representation found by the court
to have been n1ade was,
"That said 1nine was then in fine condition~
when in truth and in fact defendant well knew
that said mine was not in fine condition either
' confinancially or in good 1nechanical operatino36
~
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dition." (Finding 4 (c), R. 27)
While we do not find any case in which this exact
language "fine condition" was construed, there are those
sufficiently close in context as to make it apparent that
the representation is not of an actionable character.
For exan1ple, in Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment
Company, 80 Utah 52, 12 P. (2) 623, it was held that a
representation that a "note was as good as gold" was but
opinion and exaggeration, and not actionable.
In l( innear v. Prows, supra, the representation that
a company was "doing well and was a paying business"
was but opinion and not actionable.
In Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2) 56, representations that a company was "safe as any bank in
Ogden," and "its bonds were as good as gold coin" were
held to be expressions of opinion, and not actionable.
In Campbell v. Zion's Coop Home Buiding Co., 46
Utah 1, 148 P. 401, the Court said:
"The statements that investors will 'get handsome returns,' that their 'investments will be safe,'
that 'fortunes had been 1nade in the same line,'
that the 'stock was worth a dollar a share and
would double in value,' that purchasers 'could not
lose, took no chance,' that if they 'were dissatisfied with their stock the con1pany would buy it
back at par,' and statements concerning the mere
worth or value of the defendant's holdings or
assets, future costs and expenses of operation,
futttre profits to be derived from the business, or
from the purchase of stocks or other investments,
the future ability of the defendant to pay dividends, and other similar expressions and statements, that 'the purchase of 5,000 shares would
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make the purchaser independent fo~ l~e, wo~d
not have to work any more,' that this Is_ the bi?gest thing I ever knew in 1ny life, the. biggest m
the state, the best thing ever sold, a mighty good
thing,' and other similar statements and ex~res
sions are mere opinions, beliefs, future promises,
assurances, or happenings, or 'trade talk' and
'puffings,' and not, in themselves, actionable.~'
(Italics added.)
In the light of the foregoing it is obvious that a
statement by the defendant that the mine was in "fine
condition" could not under any circumstances be construed as other than opinion, and not actionable.
Another reason why this representation is not actionable lies in the fact that the trial court did not purport to find that the mine was not in fine condltion as
represented by the defendant, but on the contrary limited
its finding to the fact that it was not in "fine condition
* * * financially or in good 1nechanical operating condition."
We appreciate that the expression "'fine condition,,
is so relative in nature as not to be subject to a categorical negative finding, and that the court could not in the
very nature of things find that the mine as such was not
in fine condition. In this respect, accordingly~ the finding of falsity as spelled out by the trial court, constitutes
something considerably less than 1naterial falsity.
Whether a company is in ••fine financial or good
rnechanical operating condition" is a condition of degree.
What is fine in one 1nan 's opinion 1nay only be good in
another's or s01uething less than even good, because they
1nay be applying different standards. Here the company
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had just completed its 1952 operations with a run of
27,000 tons and $99,000 sales proceeds as compared with
21,000 tons and $7 4,000 sales in 1951. While recoveries
were still low, and overall expenses still exceeded operating income, the engineers felt that with the new improvements that had been installed in the fall of 1952, or
were being installed, that they were getting the problem
of recoveries licked. Extensive stripping operations had
been undertaken to prepare the ore body for the coming
year's operations, and, despite set backs of previous
years, operations for the con1ing year were viewed with
confidence.
Mr. Duvall himself had reflected his own confidence
in the condition of the mine as it then existed, and in its
future, by putting an additional $5,000.00 of his own
money into the Company on December 9, 1952, less than
two weeks prior to the date of plaintiff's loan.
Under the circumstances it can well be said that the
mine as such was in the opinion of its operators in "fine
condition" despite the fact that the Company still had
financial troubles and 1nechanical operating problems,
and it is obvious that the trial court had this in mind
in limiting its finding of falsity as it did.
(d) The fourth representation found by the court
to have been rnade, was,
"That it would be impossible for any investor
to lose one cent of money, as there was more than
enough blocked out to pay all notes with interest,
when in truth and in fact said mining operation
was then costing more than was being received
therefrom, and there was not sufficient income
from production to pay the obligations owing by
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the corporation or the costs of operation." (Finding 4 (d), R. 27) .
This representation should for the purpose of considering materiality be broken into two parts, (a) it
would be impossible for any investor to lose one cent of
money, and (b) there was more than enough ore blocked
out to pay all notes with interest.
The (a) part, that it would be impossible for any
investor to lose one cent of money, is so obviously a
matter of opinion and but a forecast of the future as to
require little comment. The Utah cases of Ackerman v.
Bramwell Investment Company, Kinnear v. Prows, Hull
v. Flinders, Campbell v. Zions Co-op, all supra, establish
that any statement such as this cannot under any circumstances form the basis for an action in fraud.
In the sa1ne category is the (b) part of the representation, that then~ was enough ore blocked out to pay
all notes with interest. Certainly this is nothing more
than a forecast of the Company's future operations. No
one could contend nor did the plaintiff so attempt in this
case, that notes could be paid from ore in the ground,
blocked out or otherwise. The purport of the representation is that with the processing of the blocked out ore
and the sale of the gold, there would be adequate revenues to pay the notes, which is plainly and simply a forecast of the results of future operations. Reference again
is 1nade to the case of Campbell Y. Zions Co-op., supra.
in which this Court specifically held that state1nents of
"],uture costs and expenses of operation, future profits to be derived from tl1e business, *u.
the future ability of defendant to pay dividends,
and other sin1ilar expressions and statmnents *u
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are mere opinions, beliefs, future promises, assurances, or happenings, or 'trade talk' and 'puffings,' and not in themselves actionable."
The value of the ore from the standpoint of plaintiff depended upon its being processed, an act to take
place in the future, the occurrence of which depended upon future contingencies. As stated in Limerick v. Jefferson Life Insuranc.e Co. (Okla.) 169 P.lOSO:
"The general rule is that, whenever property
of any kind depends for its value upon a contingency which may never occur, or developments
which may never be made, opinion as to its value
must necessarily be more or less of a speculative
character; and no action will lie for its expression,
however fallacious it may prove, or whatever the
injury a reliance upon it may produce."
Another reason why the representation is not actionable lies in the absence of any finding of falsity by the
trial court. It is indeed significant that the lower court,
in lieu of finding that the representation was false as
made, or in lieu of finding "that there was not enough
ore blocked out to pay all notes with interest" (a finding
it obviously could not make as there was no evidence
whatever on the subject), limited itself to finding that
operating costs were then in excess of mining receipts,
and that production income was insufficient to pay corporate obligations or operating costs-matters completely irrelevant to the subject of the representation.
While these factors might cast some doubt on the
company's ability to pay its obligations, they certainly
are by no means conclusive, and being inconclusive do
not establish falsity. It is common knowledge that many
companies operate at a loss, sometimes over extended
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periods of time, supplementing operating income by borrowings, so the finding of the court, which finding is in
the language of the pleadings, that operating costs exceeded operating income, and that income from production was insufficient to pay the company's obligations,
is of no aid to the plaintiff.
Be that as it may, the whole subject of falsity of
these statements is of no consequence because the statements themselves are non-actionable as a matter of law.
6.

THE LOWER COURT NEGLECTED AND REFUSED
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS REQUIRED
BY THE UTAH RULES OF ·CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Under Rule 52, U.R.C.P. the trial court is required
to make findings of fact, unless the same are waived.
By Rule 52 (b) a party may, within 10 days after entry
of judgment, 1nove the court to amend its findings or to
make additional findings.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment herein were entered on August 25, 1958. Within ten
days thereafter the defendant n1oved the court to amend
its findings and for additional findings. Defendant in
so moving set out in writing the precise matters upon
which he desired findings 1nade ( R. 31). The n1otion "·as
set for hearing and dui~~ argued by counsel for both
parties. At the conclusion of the argun1ent the court
denied defendant's nwtion, and declined to 1nake any
further or additional findings, but did correct the findings, conclusions and judg1nent to provide interest at
6o/o rather than 7/~,, and to allow a credit upon the judgment in the anwunt of Three Hundred Thirty Six
($336.00) Dollars instead of Two Hundred Twenty Four
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($224.00) Dollars.
The rule is, of course, and this court has so held time
and time again, that it is the duty of the trial court to
find upon all material issues raised by the pleadings and
by the evidence, and that where the evidence on specific
issues is insufficient, the court must make negative findings. Failure to make findings on material issues is
reversible error. G~auque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 89,
129 P. 429; Baker v. Hatch, 70 U. 1, 257 P. 673; Baird
v. Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060;
Thomas v. Clayton Pvano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543;
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 Utah 487, 243 P. 798; Prows v.
Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; West v. Standard Fuel
Co., 81 U. 300, 17 P. (2) 292.
In resisting defendant's motion for additional findings, plaintiff's counsel argued that the court was not
required to make negative findings, because a failure to
find was the equivalent of a negative finding, and further, that as long as the ftndings as made supported the
judgment, that was all that was necessary. We submit
that defendant was entitled to findings one way or the
other upon the several matters requested by it, and that
it was the duty of the court to make them. We will review
them briefly.
First, the court will recall from what has previously
been said, that defendant has maintained that the representation that there was 300,000 tons blocked out was
not actionable, (1) because it was not material, and (2)
because it did not proximately result in damage. Both
of these points involved material issues in the case, and
bearing thereon was the uncontradicted evidence that at
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the time the company discontinued its operations in the
fall of 1953 it had mined but a total of 113,000 tons. Thus,
whether there was originally 300,000 tons as represented
by defendant or but 200 000 as claimed by plaintiff and
' only to the question of how
found by the' court, went
much was left in the ground. Further, the presence or
absence of the additional 100,000 tons did not and could
not add to or detract from plaintiff's damages.
Thus the facts established by the uncontradicted evidence that the company finally discontinued operations
after mining but 113,000 tons, and that it did so because
its operating costs continued to exceed its operating income, were material upon the issue of damages because
those facts established as a matter of law that no damage
resulted to plaintiff by reason of there being but 200,000
tons blocked out instead of 300,000. Defendant's requested findings 1, 2, 3 and 4 (R. 31) were directed to these
facts, and the court erred in refusing to make findings
thereon.
True it is that the findings as requested would not
support the judgment the court desired to enter, and that
contrary findings would not find support in the evidence,
but that is no justification for ignoring those facts for
what they are.
Second, as previously noted. the plaintiff alleged
and offered proof that defendant represented to him that
the rninin1urn value of the ore was $4.20 per ton, its
average value was $7.00 per ton, that all the bills were
paid, and that $30,000.00 worth of gold was being shipped
rnonthly. The r_naking of these representations was denied by defendant, but the court cmnpletely jgnored them
44
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in its findings. By paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 of his
requests, defendant requested the court to find that the
representations were not made. This the court declined,
apparently upon the ground that its failure to find that
they were made is the equivalent of finding that th~y
were not rnade. We submit that the court in refusing
defendant's requests for specific findings upon these
issues was deliberately arbitrary and capricious.
Defendant's requests 14, 15 and 16 involved directly
the issue of damages. Specifically, plaintiff's own evidence had shown that while he made the loan by drawing
a check on his business account, he shortly thereafter
replaced the same with moneys jointly owned by himself
and Mrs. Greenwell, and that the note he received to
evidence the loan was payable to himself and Mrs. Greenwell jointly. This evidence was uncontradicted, but the
court nevertheless refused to find that such constituted
the true facts. Certainly under this evidence an award
of judgment in favor of plaintiff based on the full amount
of the note, which judgment completely ignores the joint
interest of :Mrs. Greenwell, cannot stand, and the trial
court was obligated to rnake appropriate findings in
accord with this evidence.
As plaintiff's damages were n1easured by the amount
of the Duvall Company obligation, which in turn was
evidenced by the note, there could be no finding in his
favor until the court specifically found the amount of
his ownership interest in the note. It was, accordingly
mandatory upon the trial court to rnake findings in relation to Mathilda B. Greenwell, which would in turn defeat
the judgment ordered in favor of the plaintiff.
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A final group of requested findings, namely, requests 21 and 22, related to the value of the note of the
Duvall Company ($5,000.00 principal) and the value
of the 500 shares of Duvall Company stock as of December 22, 1952, the date upon which they were received by
plaintiff in return for the $5,000.00 loan.
This court has stated and restated the proposition
that damages in a fraud action are measured by the difference in value as of the time of the fraud, of the property received by plaintiff, and the value the property
would have then had if defendant's representations had
been true. In other words, in the instant case, the difference in the value of the note and the stock as of December
22, 1952, and their then value had defendant's representations been true. Kinnear v. Prows, supra; Pace v.
Parrish, supra. And in Hecht v. J.lletzler, 1-± Utah 408,
48 Pac. 37, this court stated:
"'Vith reference to da1nages, the case must be
tried just as it ''Tould have been tried the day after
the contract was n1ade, if the question had arisen
at that tiine."
It was, accordingly, 1nandatory upon the court and
essential that it find the value of the note and the stock
as of Dece1nber :2:2, 195:2. If they then had some value,
then plajntifl''~ judg1nent (disregarding for present purposes the interest of 1\Irs. Greenw·ell) would be the difference hPhH'l'll that nllue and $5,000.00. If theoretically
t lwy had no Yalue (a finding that could not be 1uade und<'r tllP evidence in this case). then the dmnages could
h<' til<> full $5,000.00. But the point is that smnewhere
tlw trial court n1ust 1nake a specific finding of value

with rl'~ped to the note and stock as of December ~~.
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1952, which was specifically called to the Court's attention by defendant's requests for findings 21 and 22, which
it has so far failed and refused to do. The reason for its
refusal is patent-there is simply no evidence upon which
it can predicate such a finding. There is no evidence
that they were wholly without value, nor is there any
evidence that they were of any particular value. It's a
case of no evidence at all as to what the value was, which
in and of itself defeats the judgment, as the burden was
on plaintiff to establish such value or lack of value, and
failing therein his action must fail.
It was, accordingly incumbent upon the court to find,
as requested by defendant, that the note and stock was
not wholly without value, even though it could not specify
any particular value.

At this time we take cognizance of the fact that the
court did find as follows:
"7. At the time of said advance, and at all
times since, the said Duvall Company was and is
insolvent and unable to pay the amount of said
advance and said stock was at the time of said
delivery worthless and of no value."
We anticipate that plaintiff may urge that such
finding of general insolvency is the equivalent of a specific finding of "no value" as to the note, but we submit
such is not the case. Insolvency means many things to
many persons, and different things to different courts.
It may, for example, mean only an inability to pay one's
obligations promptly as they mature-which is a far cry
from meaning that the obligations are wholly worthless.
Or the word may refer to a situation where one's liabilities exceed in total amount one's total assets, in which
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event the insolvent's obligations may still be of substantial value. If there is property out of which the obligor
may p~y any percentage of his obligation, the obligation
is not without value, even though the obligor may be insolvent. As stated in Luse v. Rea (Tex.) 207 S.W. 942:
"One may have sufficient property out of
which to pay any percentage of his debt less than
100 percent, and yet be insolvent, and the conclusion that one is insolvent does not justify the conclusion that his note is wholly worthless."
We submit, accordingly, that the finding that the
Duvall Company "was and is insolvent and unable to pay
the amount of said advance" is not a finding that the
note then was valueless, but is at most a finding that its
value may have been something less than 100%. What
that value was the court should have found, and if there
was no evidence fro1n which it could make a finding
(which is the case here) it should have dismissed the action for failure of proof.
Nor does the subsequent finding (Finding 8, R. 28)
as follows:

"'8. Thereafter. and before said promissory
note beca1ne due, the said Duvall Cmnpany assigned its assets for the benefit of creditors and said
assets han? been cmnpletel~,. liquidated, from
which liquidation plaintiff has received, on or
about ~{arch 6, 195S. the sun1 of $336.00."
aid pJainti ff iu this Inatter. rl_1he fact that the note may
su b~('quen tly to Dece1nber ~:2. ln5:? have depreciated in
value is of no ~ignifieance. Here the assign1nent for benel'i t of creditors wa8 1nade nearly a year and a half after
the note wa~ given, and the faet that plaintiff received
but $336.00 though that liquidation is certainly not the
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equivalent of a finding that such was all the note and
stock was worth a year and a half earlier. Any number
of things for which the defendant may not be held responsible may have intervened during this one and a
half year period which affected the company's ability
to repay the note.
We sub1nit that the trial court had a duty to make
specific findings upon the several matters herein discussed, and that its failure and refusal so to do constitutes prejudicial and reversible error.
7.

THERE IS NO PROOF OF DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF
IN THIS CASE.

Several facets of this point of argument have heretofore been discussed, as for example, the requirement
that damage proximately result from the falsity of the
representation, and the necessity for specific findings,
but the question of the correct theory of damages in a
fraud action is so critical in this case: and in similar cases
yet to be tried, we feel it merits further consideration.
As previously pointed out, the general rule as laid
down by this court in its previous decisions (Kinear v.
Prows) supra) Pace v. Parrish) supra), is that damages
in a fraud action are measured by the difference in value
as of the tirne of the fraud, between the property received by the plaintiff, and the value the property then
would have had if defendant's representations had been
true. As stated in Hecht v.lvletzler) supra)
"With reference to damages, the case rnust be
tried just as it would have been tried the day after
the contract was nmde, if the question had arisen
at that time."
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The fact that the property here involved is the company's promissory note, representing its undertaking to
repay the loan, coupled with some shares of stock, does
not change the rule.
For the purpose of determining damages it is still
incumbent upon the court to reconstruct from competent
evidence the dollar value of plaintiff's interest in the
promissory note as of the date of the loan, December 22,
1952, and compare that value with plaintiff's interest
in the face amount thereof. If it is less than the plaintiff's interest in the face amount, and the difference is
proximately attributable to the falsity of defendant's
representaton, such difference and only such difference
represents plaintiff's recoverable damages.
The rule of law sometimes indulged in other types
of cases to the effect that where exact damages are difficult to prove, the plaintiff need onl~~ prove them as best
he can, has no application in a fraud action where damage is an elen1ent of the offense itself, and, rnust be
proven by clear and conrincing eridence.
A case that denwnstrates the point is that of Crowley v. Goodrich, (\~t.) 44 .A.. (2) 1:2S. There the plaintiff
n1ade a loan for $2,000.00, evidenced by the promissory
note of Ooodrich-Daniell Lun1ber Cmnpany~ and secured
hy mortgage upon son1e ti1nber land. Plaintiff claimed
the loan wa~ indueed by the fraud of defendant, and
~u('d for damages. It was established that the security
wn~ of the valne of not to exet•ed $600.00, but no express
l'inding ol' ~ueh value was 1nade by the trial court, and

court. ga.Vl' plaintiff judgn1ent for $:2,:214.33, repre~t>Hting the face of the note and interest.
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On appeal the defendant contended that no damages
were awardable because the court did not make any
findings with respect to the value of the security, or of
the note independent of the security, and wit}wut those
findings no judgment could stand. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, contended that if defendant was entitled to any
deduction because of values of the note and mortgage,
the burden was on him to prove such values. With respect to a deduction for the value of the security, i.e.,
the mortgage, the court held that the trial court should
have determined such value as of the date of the transaction and deducted it, and that the burden of proving
the mortgage was without value, if such was plaintiff's
contention, and of securing appropriate findings thereon, was on the plaintiff.
However, and this is the principal point we are developing, the court went on and pointed out that in
addition to the mortgage security, the plaintiff held the
company's note, and that plaintiff must prove what if any
value it had as of the date of the transaction in addition
to the value of the mortgage, to the end that the trial
court might also make proper deduction therefor. The
court said:
"In the present case the plaintiffs, in addition
to the mortgage on the timber, held the note of the
Lumber Corporation for $2,000. Any payment
made to the plaintiffs on this note should have
been credited to the defendant in mitigation of
damages. 11erchants National Bank v. Taylor,
supra. In order that no deduction from damages
be allowed for value of this note, it was incumbent
on the plaintiffs to allege and prove that vt was
not collectible at the time the loan was made be-
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cause of the insolvency of maker or for any other
sufficient reason."

Thus, in the instant case one of the critical questions
for the trial court upon the issue of damages, was what
was the value of plaintiff's interest in the note as of December 22, 1952, which was nearly a year prior to the
company's terminating its operations, as compared to its
value (which could not in any event have exceeded the
face amount thereof) had defendant's representations
been true.
On this point plaintiff originally pleaded only that
"at the present time the Duvall Company is insolvent and
unable to pay its obligations," which obviously meant
nothing as it referred at most to a situation that existed
when the cmnplaint was filed, some two and a half years
subsequent to the date of the transaction. Thus, no actionable damage was there pleaded.

By the an1endments to the complaint (Par. 6, R. 17)
the plaintiff substituted the following for the foregoing:
"6. By reason of the false representations
of the defendant, plaintiff was induced to advance
to the said Duvall rmnpany, on or about December 21, 193:2. the sun1 of $5,000.00 as a loan, for
which adYance plaintiff received the promissory
note of the Duvall Cmnpany in the mnount of
$5,000.00 and stock in the emnpany of the par
value of $5,000.00; that at said tin1e and since the
said Duvall Cmnpany was insolvent and unable
to pay ~aid prmnissory note and said stock was
worthlPss and of no value.··
'The pfft>et of the runendn1ent is to plead insolvency

of the Duvall Company as of the date of the transaction,
but no where has the plaintiff pleaded that the note was
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then worthless, or that its then value was anything less
than its face amount. The most that can be said of the
pleading is that the Duvall Company was then unable
to pay the note in full, which is certainly something very
different from pleading that it was worthless. The plaintiff was very meticulous in pleading that the stock he
received was worthless, but equally meticulous in avoiding pleading that the note was other than of substantial
value.
We submit that even as of now plaintiff's complaint
is fatally defective in its allegations of actionable damage.
Apart from the pleadings, however, what was the
Many exhibits in the form of operating reports
were introduced by plaintiff to the end of proving that
the operation lost money from the start-a point defendant has not and does not deny. The reports of his engineers and technicians demonstrate, however, that they had
continuing faith in their ability to correct the technical
shortcomings in the operation, and ultimately to get it on
a profitable basis. Those reports and those exhibits,
however, do not reach the fundamental question now
under consideration, namely, that of value as of December 1952-and with respect to which the court in effect
found a total absence of value even though the plaintiff
neither pleaded nor proved the note to be valueless.
proof~

There is, however, one exhibit in the record that
points unerringly to this problem, and which demonstrates conclusively the fallacy of the trial court's conclusion that the note was of no value. This exhibit is the
copy of the company's federal income tax return for the
year 1952 (Exhibit Q), which incorporated a balance
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sheet showing the company's condition as of the very
time we are here concerned, December 1952. This exhibit
was offered by plaintiff, and received by the court on
plaintiff's behalf. It was prepared by the company's accountants, Messrs. Wells, Baxter and Miller, and no
suggestion has been made that it is other than accurate.
Even the most casual examination of this exhibit discloses that the Company in December 1952, had very
tangible assets, and thus a determination by the court
that the note was then wholly without value, a finding
which was not in fact made but which is the only basis
upon which the judgment could be justified, not only
finds no support in the evidence, but is contrary to the
uncontradicted evidence.
Further, and in addition to the tangible value disclosed by the exhibit, are the intangibles-the hopes and
prospects. By hindsight it may now righteously be stated
that those hopes and prospects were somewhat negative,
but such can be said of almost every undertaking that
ultimately fails. In December, 1952, hopes were still
high, and it is in that light that values must be determined.
Enlightening upon this point is the observation of
the Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Menefee v.
Blitz, (Ore.) 179 P. ( 2), 550, a case not dissilnilar to the
present, albeit in that case oil was involved instead of
gold, and corporate stock instead of a eorporate note:
"The evidence indicates, in our opinion, that
the stock possessed value on the day of its purchase. We shall now recite the facts upon which
we base that staten1ent. The stock under consideration was issued by a corporation which \Yas
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seeking to extract hidden treaure, in the form of
oil, from the bowels of the earth. It might develop
that there was no oil in the stratum for which the
drill was headed, but the things which man hopes
he will find in the unknown often lend to a project
more value than the things which he actually
possessses. The corporation in which the respondent bought his stock was following a plan of action
which was devised by a competent geologist; the
latter was in charge of the drill. At the beginning
it was thought that oil in large quantities would
be found in the Vaqueros sand and that the latter
would be encountered at a depth of about 3,000
feet. It was assumed, however, that it might be
necessary to go down much deeper. When the
respondent purchased his stock, the drill had not
yet reached the Vaqueros sand. When the drilling
stopped in September 1937 hopes of discovering
oil had not been abandoned. They were still entertained notwithstanding discouraging developments. The cessation of activities was 'because
they ran out of money and the equipment was no
good.' Those are the words of the respondent
himself."
Such was the case here, and we submit that there is
no evidence whatever in the record to support the judgment based on the full face amount of the note, first,
because the uncontradicted evidence discloses that the
plaintiff owned less than the full amount thereof, and he
could not under any circumstances recover more than
the value of his interest, and second, such evidence establishes that the note on December 22, 1952, had substantial
value, and without a finding specifically as to that value,
any judgment must fail.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and each thereof, the
judgment of the trial court cannot be permitted to stand,
but should and must be summarily reversed. It is further
abundantly clear from plaintiff's own evidence that actionable fraud does not exist in this case for the reasons,
(1) the representations relied upon by the plaintiff are
non-actionable as a matter of law, and ( 2) the damage
suffered by plaintiff, if any, did not flow from the falsity
of any representation allegedly made by defendant, but
on the contrary found its causation in circumstances and
conditions inherent in the mining operation, wholly unrelated to any representation or statement made by the
plaintiff.
This case should be remanded to the lower court
under instructions that it be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Appellant
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